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The equivalence of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and
cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) has been vigorously debated
in the health economic literature. In this paper we review
and reﬁne the conditions for the equivalence of CEA and
CBA. The previously stated conditions require that 1)
each individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) is constant and does not vary
with the magnitude of QALY gains, and 2) the WTP per
QALY is identical for every individual in society. Based
on mathematical programming formulations of CEA and
CBA, we note that condition 2 can be replaced with two
other conditions, which together are less restrictive than
the requirement that every individual have the same WTP
per QALY. Even with this less restrictive set of conditions,
CEA and CBA are unlikely to be equivalent under real
world conditions. When CEA and CBA do lead to dif-
ferent resource allocation decisions, the most appropriate
framework for health economic analysis depends on 
the perspective regarding distribution issues. We also
examine the equivalence of two different deﬁnitions of
CEA provided in the literature and discuss the problems
that could arise when there are multiple optima.
Keywords: cost-beneﬁt analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis.
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ABSTRACT
Introduction
The distinctions between cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) and cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) have been
vigorously debated in the health economic literature
[1,2]. The metric for decision making in CEA is 
the ratio if the incremental cost to incremental 
effectiveness, measured in quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs). On the other hand, the metric in CBA is
the net beneﬁt, deﬁned as the difference between the
incremental beneﬁts and incremental costs.
Phelps and Mushlin [1] argue that the two analy-
ses are equivalent and that decisions made about
medical resources using CE analysis are wholly
analogous to those using CB analysis. This implies
that analyses using CEA and CBA should result 
in identical allocation of health-care resources and
that the only distinction between CEA and CBA is
in the measurement of health beneﬁts.
An alternate approach to examining the dis-
tinction between CEA and CBA was provided by
Donaldson [2] and was based on the question that
the analyst was attempting to answer, rather than
what was being measured. According to his deﬁni-
tion, the objective of CEA is to determine the least
costly way to achieve a goal, while the objective of
CBA is to determine whether the goal is worth
achieving. Based on these deﬁnitions, he argues that
the near equivalence between the two methodolo-
gies is a fallacy, since they do not address the same
allocation question.
A third point of view on the distinction between
CEA and CBA was provided by Johannesson [3], 
in which he argued that CEA could be viewed as a
subset of CBA. Furthermore, CEA and CBA would
be equivalent if: 1) the willingness to pay (WTP) per
unit of effectiveness is constant; and 2) this WTP is
the same for everyone.
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light 
on these seemingly contradictory assertions in the
health economic literature. In reality, the alternative
approaches described above overlap substantially
and differ from one another mostly in the deﬁni-
tions of CEA and CBA. The objectives of the paper
are:
1. to formulate CEA and CBA as optimization
problems using a mathematical programming
framework;
© ISPOR 1098-3015/02/$15.00/338 338–346
339Equivalence of CEA and CBA
2. to derive conditions under which the different
formulations are equivalent;
3. to examine whether these conditions of equiva-
lence are likely to hold under real-world 
conditions;
4. to examine the choice of the most appropriate
methodology for health economic analysis when
CEA and CBA are not equivalent.
Deﬁnitions of CEA and CBA
In this section, we will focus on allocation of
resources for health interventions. We derive for-
mulations for CEA and CBA from the perspective
of a societal decision maker whose task it is to
choose the optimal set of health-care interventions
that will maximize societal well being. Ideally, such
allocation of health-care resources will occur in 
the context of allocating the entire societal budget,
where decisions regarding not only health-care
spending, but also regarding allocation of resources
for education, the environment and public works,
have to be made. We will address health economic
analysis and its focus on allocation of resources for
health interventions and will refer to the problem
of societal resource allocation only when it has a
bearing on the choice of methodology for health
economic analysis.
We ﬁrst deﬁne “I” potentially overlapping 
subgroups within a given society. Individual mem-
bers of a subgroup are assumed to suffer from the
same medical condition, to be in identical health
states, with the same expected response to treat-
ments for that condition and of the same socioeco-
nomic category. This does not imply that all
individuals in a subgroup have identical response 
to treatment, or identical preferences for health 
outcomes. It implies only that though individual
responses to treatment may vary, characteristics
such as age, gender, disease duration, and comor-
bidity are not used as distinguishing features
between members of the subgroup in terms of their
expected response to available treatments, or the
willingness to pay for improvements in health out-
comes. Note that one individual can belong to more
than one subgroup if he/she suffers from more than
one medical condition.
Let J(i) be the ﬁnite set of medical interventions
available to treat individuals in subgroup i. If two
drugs, say A and B, and their combination (A + B)
are available to treat a given subgroup, these would
be considered to be three different interventions.
Similarly, different dosages of the same drug would
be considered to be different interventions. Note
that the absence of, or no treatment, is an option
that should be included in J(i) for any subgroup i.
The objective of the societal decision maker is to
assign one and only one intervention from J(i) for
each individual in a subgroup i. The framework is
such that the decision maker can assign different
interventions for different individuals within a given
subgroup. It may not be logical for the societal deci-
sion maker to treat certain patients in a subgroup
differently from others given that the individuals 
are indistinguishable in terms of their expected
response to each intervention. However, this could
indeed happen for certain formulations of the CEA
problem, as will be demonstrated.
We further deﬁne the variables used to formulate
CEA and CBA as optimization problems. Let Ni be
the number of individuals in subgroup i. In view of
the decision maker’s objective to assign each patient
in a subgroup to one and only one intervention, the
decision maker must determine the number of indi-
viduals Nij (0 £ Nij £ Ni) in subgroup i to be treated
with each intervention j (ŒJ(i)), such that S jŒJ(i)
Nij = Ni. This constraint ensures that each patient is
treated with one and only one intervention. The
allocation of individuals to different interventions
in CEA depends on the QALY gain (Qij) and cost
(Cij) for a random individual in subgroup i treated
with intervention j. In the CBA framework, the
beneﬁt provided by the intervention is measured not
only in terms of QALYs, but also in terms of the
WTP (Wij) for intervention j, of a random individ-
ual in subgroup i. One can use the monetary
amount that an individual is willing to pay per
QALY to examine the equivalence of CEA and
CBA. Let n be the WTP per QALY of a randomly
chosen individual in the society and ni, the WTP per
QALY of a randomly chosen individual in subgroup
i. The distribution of ni could differ from that of n
if the subgroup i is different from the overall pop-
ulation in terms of WTP per QALY. Note that the
difference between Wij and ni is that Wij is the WTP
for the QALY gain from intervention j, while ni is
the WTP for one QALY.
Of the two methodologies under discussion, CEA
is more widely used in health economic analysis.
The CEA decision rule as described by Johannesson
and Weinstein [4] is to treat every individual in each
subgroup with the intervention that has the highest
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio below a thresh-
old value V, after eliminating interventions ruled
out because of simple or extended dominance. The
threshold value V corresponds to the monetary
value that society places on a unit of effectiveness
or one QALY, for instance. In this framework the
objective of the decision maker is to allocate
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resources in a manner that will maximize QALYs
with the condition that each additional QALY
cannot cost more than V dollars. To estimate the
value of V, the societal decision maker needs to
determine what society is willing to pay for each
additional QALY. Even though there are several
potential sources of V [5], welfare economic theory
suggests that V should be based on WTP per QALY
of the individuals in that society.
At this point, it is important to reiterate the dif-
ference between n, ni, and V for the sake of clarity.
All three measure the WTP for one QALY. As
stated, n is the WTP per QALY of a randomly
chosen individual in the society, and ni the WTP per
QALY of a randomly chosen individual in subgroup
i. Thus, E[n] = E[ni] for all i, if each subgroup is
identical in terms of WTP per QALY. V is the mon-
etary value that a societal decision maker places 
on one QALY, and is commonly set equal to the
expected value of WTP per QALY of the individu-
als in the society (E[n]) [3].
CEA as deﬁned by Johannesson and Weinstein
[4] is now presented as an optimization problem.
Laska et al. [6], proved mathematically that Johan-
nesson and Weinstein’s [4] CEA decision rule is
identical to a decision rule for choosing the inter-
vention that maximizes net beneﬁt for each disease,
where the value V is used to convert expected
QALY gains into monetary units. As per Laska et
al. [6], the decision maker can solve the following
linear program to determine the number of patients
in each subgroup that should be treated with the
different interventions such that QALYs are maxi-
mized, while paying no more than V dollars for
each additional QALY.
(1)
(2)
where E[Qij] and E[Cij] are the expected QALY
gain and expected cost per person, respectively, 
for individuals in subgroup i treated with interven-
tion j.
As noted earlier, it is interesting to consider 
at this point whether the societal decision maker
would treat some patients in a subgroup differently
than others. In fact, it is easy to show that there
exists an optimal solution to CEA-V such that
Nij* = Ni for one j*ŒJ(i) and Nij = 0 for all j1 j*, for
every subgroup i (see Appendix A for the proof). In
other words, there exists at least one optimal solu-
tion to CEA-V where every individual in each sub-
group is treated with one and only one intervention
from the available options. This intervention j* is
ST: N N  ij J i ij iS Œ ( ) = ",
CEA-V:Max V E Q E C Ni j J i ij ij ijS S Œ ( ) ¥ [ ] - [ ]( ) ¥
the one that maximizes (V ¥ E[Qij] - E[Cij]) for the
given i. Note that alternate optimal solutions may
exist in which some proportion of individuals in a
subgroup may be treated with one intervention, and
the rest with another. This happens when more than
one intervention has the same maximum value for
(V ¥ E[Qij] - E[Cij]). This will be examined more
closely in the next section.
The CEA-V formulation does not have an
explicit budget constraint and hence, does not place
an upper bound on the amount of money that 
can be spent on health care. The budget constraint
is implicitly captured through the value V, which
places an upper bound on the amount of money
that society is willing to spend to increase health by
one QALY.
An alternate deﬁnition of CEA was provided by
Donaldson [2]. In his deﬁnition of CEA, the objec-
tive of the decision maker is to maximize effective-
ness while holding costs within a given health-care
budget. Let us assume that an amount of B dollars
is available in the health-care budget. It may seem
odd to prespecify a budget independent of the cost
of available treatments, although decision makers
may face such budget constraints, at least in the
short term. The decision maker can solve the fol-
lowing linear program to determine the number of
patients in each subgroup that should be treated
with the different interventions to maximize QALYs
while holding costs within the given health-care
budget:
(3)
(4)
(5)
In contrast to CEA-V, which does not place an
explicit limit on health-care expenditures, in CEA-
B the health-care expenditures are limited to be less
than B dollars. In contrast to CEA-V, it is possible
that in the CEA-B formulation the only optimal
solution may involve treating different individuals
in a given subgroup with different interventions
(Appendix 1 # 2). The equity issues raised by treat-
ing different individuals in a subgroup with differ-
ent interventions has been addressed elsewhere [7].
Distinctions between CEA-V and CEA-B are dis-
cussed in more detail below.
CBA is a commonly used analytical framework
for economic evaluations. In the CBA framework,
the objective of the decision maker is to allocate
resources to maximize the expected societal net
beneﬁt, which is the difference between the
S j J i ij iN N  iŒ ( ) = ",
ST: E C N Bi j J i ij ijS S Œ ( ) [ ] ¥( ) £
CEA-B:Max E Q Ni j J i ij ijS S Œ ( ) [ ] ¥( )
341Equivalence of CEA and CBA
expected WTP for the interventions and the
expected cost of providing the interventions. Based
on the principles of welfare economics, the decision
maker estimates the societal net beneﬁt as an aggre-
gation of individual net beneﬁts. The decision
maker can solve the following linear program to
determine the number of patients in each subgroup
that should be treated with the different interven-
tions to maximize expected societal net beneﬁt:
(6)
(7)
where E[Wij] is the expected willingness to pay for
intervention j for individuals in subgroup i.
In the following section, we compare CBA to
CEA-V, which is the commonly used formulation
for CEA. Thereafter, we compare the two different
formulations of CEA: CEA-V and CEA-B.
CEA-V versus CBA
The conditions for equivalence of CEA-V and CBA
based on objective functions (1) and (6) above are
derived as follows: the two formulations would be
equivalent if
(8)
Johannesson [3] states the two conditions that
are required for the equivalence of CEA and CBA
as follows:
1. the WTP per QALY is constant for an individ-
ual, i.e., does not vary with the magnitude of
QALY gain or loss;
2. the WTP per QALY is the same for all 
individuals.
If condition (1) holds, then WTP for intervention
j for an individual in subgroup i is given by:
(9)
Since the individual is willing to pay ni for every
QALY gained, regardless of the magnitude of QALY
gain. If condition (2) holds, then ni and V are both
equal to the same constant. If both conditions (1)
and (2) above hold, then:
(10)
(11)
Thus, it is evident that the conditions stated by
Johannesson [3] are sufﬁcient for the equivalence of
CEA and CBA.
= ¥ [ ] =V E Q  ( V based on condition 2)ij i
E W E Q  (based on condition 1)ij i ij[ ] = ¥[ ]
W Qij i ij= ¥
V E Q E Wij ij¥ [ ] = [ ]
S j J i ij iN N  iŒ ( ) = ",
CBA:Max E W E C Ni j J i ij ij ijS S Œ ( ) [ ] - [ ]( ) ¥
However, Johannesson’s condition (2) is not nec-
essary and can be replaced by the following two
conditions, which together are less restrictive than
condition (2):
2a) the expected WTP per QALY is the same in
every subgroup, and
2b) the WTP per QALY (ni) and the QALY gain
from an intervention j (Qij) for a randomly
chosen individual in subgroup i are indepen-
dent random variables.
Condition 2a implies that:
(13)
Johannesson [3] illustrated using an example of
how the equivalence of CEA and CBA may be vio-
lated when the WTP per QALY varies across sub-
groups. Condition 2b implies that:
(13)
If conditions (1) (2a), and (2b) hold then:
(14)
(15)
(16)
Thus, if conditions (1) (2a), and (2b) hold, CEA and
CBA are equivalent. Conditions 2a and 2b together
are less restrictive than condition (2), which
requires that the WTP per QALY be identical for
every individual. Conditions (2a) and (2b) taken
together do not require this. Instead they require
only that the expected WTP per QALY be the same
in every subgroup, and that ni and Qij be indepen-
dent within a given subgroup i. The independence
implies that the value of one of the variables does
not inﬂuence the value of the other. Thus, the WTP
per QALY of an individual has no inﬂuence on the
QALY gain derived by that individual from a given
intervention. Empirical data is not currently avail-
able to determine whether this is a reasonable
assumption.
Reasons for Divergence
The assumption that WTP per QALY is constant
within an individual (condition 1) is not realistic;
an individual’s WTP per QALY will generally
decrease with increases in QALYs. Such a relation-
ship between WTP per QALY and magnitude of
QALY gain for an individual would violate con-
dition (1) required for the equivalence of CEA-V
and CBA. Hence, the resource allocations derived
= ¥ [ ]V E Q  (based on condition 2a)ij
= [ ] ¥ [ ]E E Q  (based on condition 2b)i ij
E W E Q  (based on condition 1)ij i ij[ ] = ¥[ ]
E Q E E Qi ij i ij ¥[ ] = [ ] ¥ [ ].
V E ,  i.i= [ ] "
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from CEA-V and CBA will not be identical in 
practice.
Even if the WTP per QALY was constant at the
individual level, we have shown that two more con-
ditions need to be satisﬁed for CEA-V and CBA to
be equivalent. First, the expected WTP per QALY
must be the same for all subgroups. If some sub-
groups, such as those with diseases resulting from
malnutrition or lead poisoning are composed of
primarily lower-income individuals, the equality of
WTP per QALY across subgroups may not hold
true. Second, ni and Qij need to be independent
within a given subgroup. An association between an
individual’s WTP per QALY and their QALY-gain
may exist. Such an association would violate the
assumption of independence of ni and Qij. Further
empirical studies are needed to test whether condi-
tion 2b holds true in practice.
CEA or CBA
The conditions for equivalence of CEA-V and CBA
are unlikely to hold in practice. The logical next
question is which of these methodologies is prefer-
able if recommendations for resource allocation
afforded by CEA-V and CBA diverge?
Some contend that CBA has a closer and more
established connection to welfare economics than
CEA, and has an explicit grounding in welfare eco-
nomic principle [8]. If one accepts welfare econom-
ics as the foundation for the economic analysis,
CBA would be the methodology of choice.
The welfare economic foundation of health-care
decision making has been criticized by economists
for ignoring distributional issues [9]. The main criti-
cism that has been raised regarding this approach is
that it could lead to health-care resources being dis-
tributed away from individuals who place a rela-
tively low value on health, potentially due to their
inability to pay for it [10].
An alternative to the welfarist approach is the
extra-welfarist model in which the value of a unit
of health such as a QALY is identical for every 
individual in society, and one QALY is assumed to
provide the same beneﬁt or value to each individ-
ual. Valuation of health beneﬁts in the extra-
welfarist approach is not necessarily based on 
individual valuations of these beneﬁts. Since CBA 
is ﬁrmly rooted in welfare economics, acceptance of
the extra-welfarist principles would favor the use of
CEA-V, as it allows decision makers to value health
gains independently of the current distribution 
of wealth, which is at the root of the distinc-
tion between the welfarist and extra-welfarist
approaches.
CEA-V versus CEA-B
The contrast between the two CEA formulations:
CEA-V and CEA-B was examined by Donaldson
[2]. CEA-V examines how to allocate health-care
resources to maximize net societal beneﬁt based 
on the value V that society is willing to pay for a
unit of effectiveness; CEA-B attempts to maximize
the QALY gain that can be achieved within a given
health-care budget. Thus, CEA-B does not ask
whether the speciﬁed health-care budget is sufﬁcient
or excessive; instead, it considers the budget to be
exogenous to the decision problem. In CEA-V, the
health-care budget is not prespeciﬁed but is derived
as part of the solution. The fact that resources are
limited is implicit in the monetary value (V) placed
on the unit of effectiveness.
There are also conditions under which the two
formulations, CEA-V and CEA-B, yield identical
solutions (Nij*). Using the Lagrangian multiplier l
to relax the cost constraint (4) in formulation CEA-
B’ leads to the following formulation:
(17)
(18)
If (l*,Nij*) is an optimal solution to CEA-B¢,
then Nij* is an optimal solution to CEA-B. The
optimal l* in CEA-B¢ corresponds to the shadow
price of the budget constraint. This shadow price
represents change in the maximized total effective-
ness for a unit change in the budget. Thus, if the
budget B is increased by a dollar, maximized total
effectiveness increases by l*.
If l is set equal to its optimum value l* in CEA-
B¢, Nij* is an optimal solution to the resulting for-
mulation. If we substitute l* for l and rearrange
terms, the objective function (17) can be written as
follows:
(19)
Multiplying the objective function by a constant,
and eliminating terms that are constants does not
change the optimal solution. Multiplying (19) by
1/l* and eliminating the constant B gives the fol-
lowing objective function:
(20)
If V = 1/l*, the formulations for CEA-B¢ and CEA-
V are identical. Thus, CEA-V and CEA-B have at
least one optimal solution in common, assuming
that the monetary value of a unit of effectiveness in
the CEA-V formulation corresponds to the recipro-
S Si j J i ij ij ijE Q E C NŒ ( ) [ ] - [ ]( ) ¥{ }l*
S Si j J i ij ij ijE Q E C N BŒ ( ) [ ] - ¥ [ ]( ) ¥{ } + ¥l l* *
ST: N N  Ij ij iS = ",
CEA-B’:Max E Q N
B E C N
i j J i ij ij
i j J i ij ij
S S
S S
Œ ( )
Œ ( )
[ ] ¥( ){ } +
- [ ] ¥( ){ }l
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cal of the shadow price on the budget constraint of
the optimal solution for CEA-B.
Although this result was also been noted by
others [5], the issue of multiple optima has not been
discussed in detail in the health economic literature.
As demonstrated, even when V = 1/l*, when mul-
tiple optima exist for CEA-V, some of these optimal
solutions may violate the budget constraint in 
CEA-B. As noted, CEA-V always has an optimal
solution, which involves treating everyone in a sub-
group with the same intervention, while this is not
necessarily true for CEA-B. Let us consider the case
where the optimal solution for CEA-B involves
treating a proportion þ* of individuals in subgroup
i1 with intervention j1 and the rest of the individu-
als (1 - þ*) with intervention j2. When V = 1/l* is
used in CEA-V there are as many optima as there
are patients in subgroup i1, with a proportion þ
(0 £ þ £ 1) of individuals in subgroup i1 receiving
intervention j1 and proportion 1-þ receiving inter-
vention j2. This happens because
and the line segment joining j1 and j2 has a slope of
V as demonstrated in Appendix A. If E(Ci1j1) > E
(Ci1j2), then solutions where þ > þ* will violate the
budget constraint.
The issue of multiple optima can be clearly illus-
trated using the graphical approach for optimal
resource allocation with CEA-V and CEA-B. 
The graphical method makes use of the cost-
effectiveness frontier (CEF) to determine the
optimal solution. The CEF connects nondominated
interventions by line segments in order of increas-
ing effectiveness.
Figure 1 is an example of a smooth convex CEF
curve. The slope of the tangent to the CEF at any
point is the incremental cost of achieving an
V E Q E C V E Q E Cij1 ij1 ij2 ij2¥ [ ] - [ ] = ¥ [ ] - [ ]
increase in effectiveness of one unit. As one moves
away from the origin, the total societal health ben-
eﬁts and the health-care expenditure increase.
However the marginal cost of achieving a unit gain
in effectiveness also increases with the slope of the
tangent. The optimal solution to the CEA-B corre-
sponds to the point (Y) on the CEF where the per-
person cost is Bi/Ni, where Bi is the hypothetical
budget allocated for treating subgroup i. This
methodology is easily extended to allocate resources
for all subgroups based on an overall budget B. The
shadow price (l*) is equal to the reciprocal of the
slope of the tangent to the CEF at Y, as the recip-
rocal of the slope gives the marginal change in effec-
tiveness for a unit change in the expenditure. The
optimal solution to the CEA-V formulation corre-
sponds to the point of tangency (Z) between a line
of slope V and the CEF and must equal 1/l* for
resource allocation to be identical for CEA-V and
CEA-B.
In practice, the CEF may not be a smooth curve
because a limited number of health interventions
are considered. In this case, the CEF is piecewise
linear as in Figure 2. The line of slope V tangential
to the CEF could pass through one of the interven-
tions or overlap with one of the line segments of the
CEF, as in the ﬁgure. In either case, the objective
function can be maximized by treating all patients
with an intervention that lies on the tangent.
In the case for CEA-B where the horizontal line
through B/Ni intersects the CEF between interven-
tions L and M, the optimal solution corresponds to
treating some patients with L and others with M. If
V is set equal to 1/l*, all points on the line segment
between interventions L and M are optimal solu-
tions for CEA-V. These points correspond to 
providing interventions L and M to different pro-
portion of patients in the subgroup such that the
proportions sum to 1. However, the solutions to
CEA-V that lie above Y on line segment LM violate
the budget constraint, and are infeasible under
CEA-B.
Reasons for Divergence
If policymakers were to equate V and 1/l*, CEA-V
and CEA-B could lead to identical allocation deci-
sions, although when CEA-V has alternate optima,
only one of these solutions corresponds to the
optimal solution for CEA-B. In theory, there are two
means of achieving equality of V and 1/l*. The
decision maker could either set the value V in the
CEA-V equal to 1/l* or choose B so that 1/l* is
equal to a predeﬁned societal value of V. Under
either alternative, the decision maker needs to solve
 
 
 
 
 
 
 QALYs per person for subgroup i 
Cost per 
person for 
subgroup i 
Z 
Y 
Bi/Ni 
CEF 
V 
1/λ
*
Figure 1 Identical allocation of health-care resources for CEA-V
and CEA-B when V is equal to 1/l*.
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for l*, and this is an extremely challenging task. To
determine l*, all parameters in the formulation for
CEA-B, including the costs and effectiveness of 
all health-care interventions for all diseases must be
speciﬁed. Formulating this optimization problem is
not possible in practice. Thus, decision makers will
not have the necessary information to choose V or
B to equate V and 1/l*.
Even if policymakers were able to equate V and
1/l* at a given point in time, the two values would
almost certainly diverge over time. Two potential
changes in the health-care system could cause this
divergence: a new intervention may become avail-
able, the adoption of which could change the value
of l*; the health-care budget (B) could change,
which again changes the value of l*. For CEA-V
and CEA-B to yield identical allocation decisions,
the value of V has to be constantly updated to equal
1/l*. Since such updating is unlikely to happen in
practice, the allocation decisions dictated by CEA-
V and CEA-B will almost certainly diverge under
real-world conditions.
Choosing the Appropriate CEA Formulation:
CEA-V or CEA-B
The relative merits of CEA-V and CEA-B has been
argued extensively in the health economic literature
[4,11,12]. The CEA-V allocation rule is to adopt
therapies whose incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios fall below a certain threshold. Gafni and
Birch [13] note that decision makers must be aware
that use of a constant threshold value per QALY to
adopt new health interventions may require an
increase in the health-care budget. However, in
many cases this may not be feasible, at least in the
short term. For instance, national health funds may
not obtain increased funding. In this case, these
agencies have to make allocation decisions using
CEA within a ﬁxed budget, i.e., resort to CEA-B.
The concept that CEA-V places no constraint on
health-care expenditure is somewhat misleading.
The value V represents an implicit budget con-
straint, limiting the monetary amount that can be
spent to gain one QALY, and arises from the fact
that the health-care budget is limited. If the budget
were not limited, the value of V would be inﬁnity,
and the most effective intervention would always be
chosen. Thus, V and B are intrinsically related and,
when these two values have the proper relationship,
CEA-V and CEA-B lead to identical resource allo-
cation decisions.
A better understanding of the relative merits of
the two approaches can be achieved by expanding
the optimization problem to include the entire
national budget, rather than just the health-care
budget. Let represent the amount spent on items
other than health care and B, the national budget.
CEA-B will provide the optimal allocation of
health-care resources if the health-care budget is B =
- *, where * is the optimal value of . CEA-
V will provide the same optimal allocation of
health-care resources if V = 1/ *, where * is the
shadow price on the societal budget constraint.
Even if one starts with the optimal value of B, this
value can change over time as the national budget
and the choice set of interventions change. The
same is true of V.
From a practical perspective, decision makers
may ﬁnd CEA-V to be a more attractive choice than
CEA-B. CEA-B requires the decision maker to 
formulate an optimization problem with complete
knowledge of the cost and effectiveness of all health
interventions for all diseases. A new intervention
can be evaluated using CEA-V by comparing its
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio to V, thus avoid-
ing the allocation problem for all diseases while
evaluating every new intervention, making CEA-V
much easier to apply in practice. Still, decision
makers must remember that CEA-V will always
require that increases in health-care expenditures be
covered by increases in health-care budgets, rather
than by reallocation of the available budget as
implied by CEA-B. They must also be mindful of
the fact that V is a dynamic quantity that varies
with budgets and technology.
Discussion
The problem of allocating societal resources among
different health-care interventions has been exam-
ined using two key methodologies (CEA, CBA).
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M
Figure 2 CEA-V with multiple alternate optima, and optimal solu-
tion to CEA-B involves treating different patients in a subgroup with
different interventions. K, L, M = interventions; V = societal
WTP/QALY;Y = cost = Bi/Ni.
345Equivalence of CEA and CBA
Considerable debate regarding the differences or
equivalence of these two methodologies, has arisen
[1,2]. Johannesson [3] argued that CEA and CBA
would be equivalent if the WTP per unit of effec-
tiveness is constant for an individual, and this WTP
is the same for everyone.
The main reason for the discrepant conclusions
of these articles is the deﬁnitions of CEA and CBA
that are the basis for comparison of these analyti-
cal methodologies. Phelps and Mushlin [1] argue
that both CEA and CBA deﬁnitions, when simpli-
ﬁed, reduce to our formulation CEA-V, and con-
clude that the two methodologies are essentially
equivalent. Donaldson [2], on the other hand, uses
our deﬁnition for CEA (CEA-V) and for CBA (CEA-
B), and argues that the two methodologies may
provide for different resource allocations. Johan-
nesson uses formulations CEA-V and CEA-B, and
then derives the conditions for equivalence of the
two. As these authors used different deﬁnitions of
CEA and CBA, it is not surprising that they arrived
at seemingly contradictory conclusions.
The long-standing question of the equivalence 
of CEA and CBA is addressed in this paper based
on formulations of these analytical frameworks as
optimization problems. Based on the mathematical
programming formulation, CEA (-V) and CBA are
equivalent if the expected WTP is the same in every
subgroup, and if the WTP per QALY and the QALY
gain from an intervention for a random individual
in a given subgroup are independent random vari-
ables. The second condition requires that an indi-
vidual’s WTP per QALY have no inﬂuence on the
QALY gain experienced by that individual from 
any health intervention. Because our condition for
equivalence does not require that the WTP per
QALY be equivalent for all individuals, it is less
restrictive than the condition provided by Johan-
nesson [3], which is sufﬁcient but unnecessary.
As per Johannesson [3], the conditions for equiv-
alence of CEA and CBA are unlikely to hold in 
practice, and are likely to yield different resource-
allocation decisions. When CEA and CBA do differ
in terms of resource allocation, the choice of
methodology depends on the theoretical assump-
tions underlying the analysis. If the analysis is based
on principles of welfare economics, CBA is the
methodology of choice. Acceptance of the extra-
welfarist principles would favor the use of CEA.
The distinction between the welfarist and extra-
welfarist approaches hinges on how they deal with
distribution of wealth and the ability to pay for
health interventions. The welfarist approach uses
willingness to pay estimates, which may depend on
the current distribution of wealth, while the extra-
welfarist approach assigns a value to health
improvements that is independent of this 
distribution.
We also examined two different deﬁnitions for
CEA found in the literature: CEA-V; to choose
interventions to maximize societal net beneﬁt based
on the value V that society is willing to pay for a
unit of effectiveness; and CEA-B, the maximization
of health beneﬁts within a given budget. Mathe-
matical programming representations of the two
methodologies were used to demonstrate that they
can yield identical resource allocations when the
monetary value of a unit of beneﬁt in CEA is the
reciprocal of the shadow price of budget constraint
in CEA-B, as noted by Stinnett and Mullahy [5].
Previous publications on this topic did not explore
the issue of multiple optima in detail. We show that
when CEA-V has multiple optima, only one of these
solutions corresponds to the optimal solution for
CEA-B. Furthermore in this case, optimal solutions
to CEA-V may violate budget constraint of CEA-B.
Although CEA-V and CEA-B can provide the
same resource allocation decision when V and B are
appropriately related to each other, they are likely
to diverge in terms of their resource allocation deci-
sions under dynamic, real-world conditions, where
budgets and choice of interventions change. If the
two methodologies do in fact yield different alloca-
tions, it is difﬁcult to determine which methodology
is preferable without examining the problem of
allocating all of society’s resources. If the available
budget is inﬂexible, then the decision maker will by
default implement the CEA-B solution. However, a
discrepancy between CEA-V and CEA-B may be an
indication that either the value of V needs updat-
ing, or that the decision maker needs additional
money for new technology. Thus, the decision
maker must be vigilant in updating V and B to keep
pace with changes in wealth and technology. Oth-
erwise, both CEA-V and CEA-B frameworks could
result in allocation decisions that lower societal
welfare.
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Appendix A
Proposition 1: There exists an optimal solution to
CEA-V such that Nij* = Ni for one j*ŒJ(i) and
Nij = 0 for all j π j*, for every subgroup i.
Proof: The simplex method for solving linear pro-
grams to is used to prove this proposition. For a
formulation with n variables and m constraints, a
basic feasible solution has n-m components set to
zero, with the rest possibly taking on positive
values. Further, at least one optimal solution must
be a basic feasible solution [14]. Hence, there exists
an optimal solution for CEA-V where at most I 
variables are positive. Since we know that the Nij-s
have to sum to Ni for each subgroup, the only way
in which this can be achieved is if Nij* = Ni for 
one j*ŒJ(i) and Nij = 0 for all j π j*, for every sub-
group i.
Proposition 2: The optimal solution to CEA-B may
involve treating different individuals in a given sub-
group with different interventions.
Proof: The proposition can be restated as: it is pos-
sible that an optimal solution for CEA-B have
Nij > 0 for more than one intervention j (ŒJ(i)).
Based on the simplex algorithm, a basic feasible
solution, and hence the optimal solution, can have
I + 1 variables that are positive. This would require
that Nij > 0 for more than one intervention j (ŒJ(i)).
In fact, there exists an optimal solution to CEA-B
where Nij > 0 for two interventions, j1 and j2, in
one subgroup i (with Nij1 + Nij2 = Ni), and Nij = Ni
for one intervention in all other subgroups.
Proposition 3: If the optimal solution for CEA-B has
Nij > 0 for two interventions, j1 and j2 in one sub-
group i1, then the corresponding CEA-V formula-
tion with V = 1/l* has an inﬁnite number of
alternate optima with a proportion þ (0 £ þ £ 1) of
individuals in subgroup i1 receiving intervention j1
and proportion 1- þ receiving intervention j2.
Proof: Let Nij* be the optimal solution for CEA-V
when i π i1. The optimal objective function value
for CEA-V is given by:
(a1)
We claim that in this is case:
(a2)
If the left hand side of equation a2 is greater than
the right hand side, the optimal objective function
value can be improved by setting N i1j1 = Ni ¥ þ* + d
(d > 0, Ni ¥ þ* + d < Ni), and setting N i1j2 = Ni -
N i1j1. Similarly if the right hand side is greater than
the left hand side, the objective function value can
be increased by increasing N i1j2 by d, and decreas-
ing Ni1j1 by d. Hence, the equality in equation (a2)
must hold. In this case, for any þ (0 £ þ £ 1),
{Nij = Nij* for i π i1, Ni1j1 = Ni ¥ þ, Ni1j2 = 1 - Ni1j1]
is an optimal solution to CEA-V.
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